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Abstract
This article explores how the Southern Slavs, decried as Völkerabfälle by 
Engels in 1849, managed nevertheless to develop a distinctively social-
ist movement and culture of their own, particularly from 1903 to 1914, 
capable of both challenging and shaping politics in the Balkans. Although 
heavily influenced by Marxist theoretical currents and external ideas such 
as Austro-Marxism, the formation of this South Slavonic Left was rooted 
in the social and historic contexts of its adherents’ respective homelands. 
Limited industrialisation, coupled with the rise of rival political move-
ments such as nationalism and peasant agrarianism, prompted many on 
the Left to turn to the region’s early socialist heritage, specifically the phi-
losopher Svetozar Marković’s concept of Balkan Federalism. As well as 
providing a means by which the region could begin to modernise through 
closer economic and political cooperation, the perceived threat of Austro-
Hungarian and Italian expansionist ambitions legitimised the left-wing 
belief that a Balkan Federation was now essential to the future preser-
vation of regional identity and political freedoms. Consequently, the 
creation of the first Yugoslavian state in December 1918 was welcomed as 
the first step to fulfilling these goals.
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In January 1849, a young Friedrich Engels published an article in Neue 
Rheinische Zeitung, on the precarious domestic state of the multi-ethnic 
Habsburg Monarchy, still gripped by the Hungarian Revolution. Besides 
commenting on the Hungarian national movement’s faltering progress, 
Engels took the opportunity to denounce those ethnic groups who had 
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lent their support to the Imperial Austrian army. Chief among these were 
the South Slavs: a subgroup of the Slavonic people inhabiting South-
East Europe’s Balkan Peninsula that includes Croats, Serbs, Bulgarians, 
Slovenes, Montenegrins, Bosnian Muslims and Macedonian Slavs. With 
the exception of Bulgaria, these peoples would be unified in 1918 in the 
first Yugoslavian state. To Engels however, this spectrum of identities, 
stemming from centuries of imperial dominance by external powers, 
impeded the South Slavs’ historic cultural development, leaving them 
servile and devoid of any coherent sense of modern nationhood. Indeed, 
not even the region’s native ‘Pan-Slavist’ movement,1 calling for political 
union among the Monarchy’s Croats, Serbs and Slovenes, could disguise 
the fact that they were little more than ‘residual fragments of peoples’, 
Völkerabfälle:  
There is no country in Europe which does not have in some corner 
or other one or several ruined fragments of peoples, the remnant of 
a former population that was suppressed and held in bondage by the 
nation which later became the main vehicle of historical development. 
These relics of a nation mercilessly trampled underfoot in the course 
of history, as Hegel says, these residual fragments of peoples always 
become fanatical standard-bearers of counter-revolution and remain 
so until their complete extirpation or loss of their national character, 
just as their whole existence in general is itself a protest against a great 
historical revolution […] Such, in Austria, are the pan-Slavist Southern 
Slavs, who are nothing but the residual fragment of peoples, resulting 
from an extremely confused thousand years of development.2
Engels’ disparaging cultural assessment can be seen to have vicariously 
informed later historical evaluations on the apparent failure of South 
Slavonic socialism, specifically the collapse of Socialist Yugoslavia in the 
early 1990s. The original interwar state, proclaimed in late-1918 as the 
‘Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes’, has been the subject of par-
ticular scrutiny, frequently presented as doomed at political inception due 
to its elites’ inability to resolve competing nationalist aspirations, the so-
called ‘nationalities question’.3 This dovetailed into broader debates as to 
why the Balkans in general had supposedly deviated from ‘an assumed 
European norm’ since the Balkan Wars of 1912 to 1913.4 
This article challenges the deterministic assumptions of Engels and later 
portrayals of socialism in the South Slavonic Balkans as simply an imported 
concept by considering how these so-called Völkerabfälle attempted to 
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adapt Marxist theories to the socio-political context of the region. Central 
to this were the efforts of the early South Slavonic Left to confront both 
the nationalities question and perceived threat of foreign imperialism by 
championing political and economic union among the South Slavonic 
nations, culminating in their support for the first Yugoslavia’s formation.5 
It also locates and historicises the experiences and shifting priorities of the 
Left against the dramatic context of the modern era, particularly 1903 to 
1918, and the extent to which ideas from this period foreshadowed those 
of Titoism. In this regard, special consideration is given to the activities 
and shifting opinions of the Serbian Social Democrat Party (SSDP) under 
the charismatic pre-war leadership of Dimitrije Tucović and Dragiša 
Lapčević. Alongside its Bulgarian counterparts, this group was arguably 
the most proactive, radical and dynamic of the South Slav Left with its 
members and political doctrines playing a leading role in the founding the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia.6  
Svetozar Marković and the Origins of Balkan Federalism
The idea that the South Slavonic peoples represented a single nation 
was not a concept unique to the modern era. Indeed, the earliest known 
expression of pan-Slavism in general can be attributed to the writings of 
the sixteenth century Dalmatian Slav humanist Vinko Pribojević who 
judged the region’s linguistic and cultural traditions as evidence of a 
‘lost’ Slav or ‘Illyrian’ identity.7 However, it was only in the nineteenth 
century that pan-Slavism gained political traction and philosophical 
cohesion among regional nationalists, including the informal recogni-
tion of a common ‘Serbo-Croatian’ language by Croat, Serb and Slovene 
linguists in 1850.8
The concept of a unified South Slavonic entity as a political construct 
was itself partially linked to the early development of Balkan socialist 
thought in the late nineteenth century; a process mainly attributed to 
the work of the radical Serbian philosopher Svetozar Marković. Having 
received his education in Russia and Switzerland – where he had become 
active in revolutionary circles – financial difficulties forced Marković to 
abandon his studies and return to Serbia in the summer of 1870. Although 
influenced by various strands of revolutionary thought – specifically 
the populism championed by the Russians Nikolay Chernyshevsky 
and Nikolay Dobrolyubov – Marković initially channelled his energies 
towards promoting economic diversification and attacking Serbia’s con-
servative political culture. Despite the recent adoption of a democratic 
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constitution, he argued that a lack of distinction between the main politi-
cal parties and the Orthodox Church’s stranglehold over the country’s 
cultural life amounted to de facto suppression of public freedoms. Even 
before his return, these rising frustrations over the state of Serbian national 
life had prompted him to found the first European-style socialist party, 
the Serbian Radical-Socialists, formulated around a detailed programme 
of social and economic domestic reforms.9 
Despite the Radical-Socialists’ growing popularity, Marković’s politi-
cal and journalistic activities resulted in him having to flee into exile in 
Austria-Hungary in order to evade arrest in 1872.10 This brief intermis-
sion, coupled with the party’s subsequent electoral failures, prompted 
him to reconsider the nascent socialist movement’s ideological approach 
in his magnum opus Serbia in the East. Through his social analysis of 
recent Serbian history, Marković argued that the early-nineteenth century 
revolutions, which had eventually won the Serbs independence from 
Ottoman rule, were expressions of an inherent class consciousness among 
the country’s peasantry. Allowing for the development of capitalism and 
continued growth of modern state structures would, he predicted, lead 
to the erosion of such qualities.11 In place of Marx’s notion of histori-
cal development, Marković proposed a loose federal association of opštine 
(municipalities) modelled on Serbia’s patriarchal peasant family zadruge 
(collectives). Much like his idealised image of the zadruge, his depictions 
of the opštine as self-sufficient and mostly self-governing, negated the 
need for a capitalist transition, reducing the role of the state to that of a 
coordinating intermediary.12 
For Marković, this revolutionary ideal of ‘zadruga socialism’ necessi-
tated the unification of all Serbs into a single polity, a belief he shared with 
nationalist intellectuals such as the philologist Vuk Karadžić, and, increas-
ingly, Serbia’s ruling elites. Indeed, since 1844, successive governments 
had preoccupied themselves in pursuing a ‘Greater Serbia’ encompassing 
territories populated by Orthodox Slavonic-speakers including Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Montenegro.13 Despite sharing 
a desire to end Habsburg and Ottoman rule in the Balkans, Marković’s 
thesis was simultaneously opposed to any form of integral nationalist ide-
ology; the Serb population in the wider Balkan ‘mosaic of nationalities’ 
was, he argued, too fragmented and often outnumbered by other ethnici-
ties. Any attempt to create a greater ethno-national state entity would 
invite ethnic unrest and exploitation from external powers. Addressing the 
subject in 1874, Marković concluded that a pan-national revolution across 
the entire Balkan Peninsula represented the only workable alternative 
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to nationalism. Applying his model of ‘zadruga socialism’ to this wider 
context, he envisioned a loose Balkan Federation comprising ‘opštinas, 
districts, states – whichever suits them best’.14 Within this socio-economic 
macrocosm, individuals would be granted the right to join one of numer-
ous self-regulating communes, irrespective of their nationality.15 
Despite warnings from his peers, Marković’s radicalism, his refusal 
to temper his criticism of the central government in Belgrade, and his 
subsequent arrest for ‘press crimes’ in 1874, captured the public imagi-
nation, elevating him as a symbol of social discontent towards Serbia’s 
state institutions. During elections to the National Assembly held in April 
that year, a small but vocal group of Radical-Socialists were elected as 
deputies, transforming his ideas into matters of serious political debate.16 
It also drew the attentions of foreign observers including the anti-Otto-
man Bulgarian Revolutionary Central Committee in Romania. Writing in 
defence of Marković’s ideas, the Committee’s equally charismatic chair-
man and militia-leader Hristo Botev argued that a future Serbo-Bulgarian 
socialist union, now embodied both their nations’ futures as well as that 
of the wider Balkans:
We are prepared to state thousands of facts showing that that union is 
natural, and necessary, and open and inevitable; that that union existed, 
exists, and will exist, and the honest and intelligent Serbs and Bulgars 
will never be ready to think otherwise.17
South Slavonic society and the Left before 1914
Marković’s sudden death from tuberculosis in March 1875, followed by 
that of Botev during Bulgaria’s failed April uprising against Ottoman rule 
in 1876, deprived the South Slavonic Left of the proactive leadership and 
revolutionary impetus needed to become a sustainable political force. 
By the turn of the twentieth century most radicals had moderated their 
agendas to appeal to wider demographics, while revolutionary activity 
was likely to merit a swift response from conservative state authorities.18 
As a result, the emergence of an organised Socialist Left was a relatively 
late development in South Slavonic Balkan politics. The first modern 
political parties only appeared in 1894 with the founding of the Bulgarian 
Workers’ Social Democratic Party (BWSDP) and Social Democratic Party 
of Croatia and Slavonia (SDPCS). These were followed in 1898 by the 
Yugoslav Social-Democratic Party (YSDP), based in Austria-Hungary’s 
ethnically Slovene territories such as the Alpine province of Carniola, the 
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SSDP in 1903, and the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(SDPBH) in 1909.19 Additionally, Slavs from Macedonia were known to 
have been active in the socialist movements of Bulgaria and the Ottoman 
Empire, including the BWSDP’s founder Dimitar Blagoev.20
Beyond these elite political and intellectual circles however, the princi-
pal challenge for the South Slavonic Left was the region’s lack of industrial 
or urban development. The formation of the first Yugoslavia illustrated 
the extent of this problem in late-1918: from an estimated population of 
twelve million, less than a quarter of the new South Slavonic kingdom’s 
citizens lived in settlements with more than 5,000 inhabitants. Despite a 
significant diversification in the agricultural sector, only around a fifth of 
all economic activity occurred in urban areas before the 1920s.21 Indeed, 
by the 1900s many of these gainfully employed town-dwellers were either 
wealthier peasants whose incomes was derived from their agricultural 
holdings, or economic migrants from rural districts working as mostly 
unskilled seasonal labourers.22   
Urban culture and the nature of capitalism in the South Slavonic 
Balkans was another critical factor. In contrast to other European 
regions, urban areas, and particularly those in the former Ottoman 
domains, had generally existed to administer largely rural populations. 
While their economic functions had grown in importance during the 
nineteenth century, most South Slavonic towns never developed into 
centres for innovation, remaining little more than trading hubs for their 
specific localities.23 Moreover, Balkan capitalism itself was commercial 
rather than industrial in nature, dominated by trade in basic com-
modities and small-scale light industry. Increased exposure to foreign 
competition compounded this issue, with many pre-existing industries 
subverted by cheap imports flooding domestic markets.24 In conjunc-
tion with this, the South Slavs were distinguished by various imbalances 
in social development. On the eve of Yugoslav unification, the Slovene 
lands recorded an illiteracy rate of around 10 per cent By contrast, over 
80 per cent of Bosnian and Macedonian Slav peasants were deemed 
unable to read or write in 1918, producing a Yugoslavian national 
average of 51 per cent.25  
This ostensibly limited socioeconomic development did not imply 
complete stagnation or an absence of industrialisation. For example, 
between 1905 and 1910 government subsidies and foreign investment 
rapidly expanded Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia-Slavonia and Serbia’s 
non-agricultural workforces, creating potential supporter bases in the 
form of organised labour. This proved especially beneficial to the SSDP, 
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which managed to bring Serbia’s Central Workers Union under party 
control in 1911.26 
Regardless of these efforts, the fact remained that modern South Slavonic 
socialism had simply developed too early to exert itself as an effective polit-
ical force. Reflecting on a series of mostly ineffectual mass demonstrations 
by 12,000 Belgrade factory workers in December 1910, Tucović spoke of 
‘two Serbias’; the Serbs might have possessed Europe’s greatest revolu-
tionary potential, yet they were unable to harness it effectively. Beyond 
the few isolated industrial enclaves, the ‘bourgeois-proletarian division’ of 
Germany and other industrial countries had failed to find ‘an appropri-
ate articulation’ since social divisions were ‘barely visible’ in rural districts 
‘whose own parliamentary deputies dress and behave as peasants’.27 
Echoing Marković’s earlier sentiment that Serbian society’s fundamental 
flaw lay in its inability ‘to create wealth’ rather than distribute it, Tucović 
considered the Balkans’ economic situation to be unique. In place of capi-
talist exploitation, Serbia’s ruling elite perpetuated an imbalanced social 
conflict between ‘patriarchy and modernity’, giving priority to popular 
wellbeing at the expense of modernisation and retarding Marx’s notion 
that an organised industrial working class would form naturally.28 
Even in the future Yugoslavia’s more industrially advanced north-west, 
socialist hopes of an emergent, literate proletariat proved redundant. As in 
other South Slavonic territories, industrialisation in the Slovene lands had 
been modest, limited to small-scale enterprises and reliant on Gastarbeiter 
from other Habsburg domains. Moreover, by 1914 the two industries 
with the greatest potential to serve as fountainheads for the labour move-
ment, textiles and iron refining, had already fallen into decline as firms 
relocated their investments to more productive and resource-rich centres 
in the German and Czech provinces.29 Consequently, the YSDP faced the 
similar problem of appealing to a pre-industrial society. This was made all 
the more difficult by its leadership’s initial refusal to exploit rising anti-
German resentment among ethnic Slovenes; a political tactic increasingly 
favoured by their more patriotically-minded conservative and liberal 
opponents.30
Ultimately, the greatest obstacle that confronted the South Slavonic 
Left before 1914 was whether to extend party membership to those por-
tions of the peasantry receptive to socialist ideas. This proved especially 
divisive for the BWSDP and SSDP, both of which had ostensibly been 
formed as parties of the industrial working class, and perceived rural 
society as socially conservative and inherently reactionary. The con-
tentious question of bolstering the parties’ rank and file from the more 
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demographically sustainable agricultural workforce became all the more 
urgent with the rise of Agrarianism as a regional political force with 
genuine mass appeal. The implications of consolidating a support base 
among rural voters was particularly evident in Bulgaria where Aleksandar 
Stamboliyski’s Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union, founded in 1899, 
quickly rose to become the main opposition party by 1914. For Bulgaria’s 
Social Democrats, Stamboliyski’s distinctively non-Marxist programme 
of radical left-wing reforms, formulated around land redistribution, was 
especially problematic.31 
Fears of the ‘peasantisation’ of South Slavonic socialism even caused 
a split in the BWSDP with Blagoev and his followers forming a rival 
BWSDP known as the ‘Narrow Socialists’ in 1903. However, in contrast 
to their ‘Broad Socialist’ opponents, the Narrow Socialists immediately 
impeded their own chances of electoral success by proposing the confis-
cation of all private property, including that of the peasantry.32 Among 
the SSDP’s members, a softening of attitudes towards increasing socialist 
activity in the countryside from 1910 to 1911, particularly from Tucović 
and Lapčević, achieved a similar result. Ironically, in relaxing the rules on 
accepting peasants, the party more than doubled its membership and saw 
its first two deputies, one of whom was Lapčević, elected to represent two 
of Serbia’s wealthiest rural districts in 1912. As with its Bulgarian counter-
part, however, this sudden surge in the SSDP’s political fortunes did not 
prevent a fissure among its most radical leftist elements, many of whom 
abandoned the SSDP following the 1912 elections to form their own party. 
Unlike Bulgaria’s Narrow Socialists, the new ‘People’s Socialist Party’ 
quickly became consigned to complete political irrelevancy.33 Even in the 
early 1900s, incompatibility between pure Marxist dogma and domestic 
realities was an already recognised fact. 
Between Austro-Marxism and Balkan Federalism: Navigating the 
‘Nationalities Question’
Throughout the late nineteenth and the opening years of the twentieth 
centuries, the South Slavonic Left’s constituent movements were primar-
ily focused on domestic questions and matters of political reform within 
their respective national territories. From 1903 to 1913, however, left-wing 
politicians and intellectuals became increasingly aware of the myriad exter-
nal threats to Balkan democracy, specifically local nationalism and Great 
Power imperialism. While recognition of these challenges was instrumen-
tal in reviving earlier socialist beliefs in pan-Slavism, they also engendered 
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divisions that came to define both the shape and character of the Left and 
often frustrated efforts to present a unified front. These disputes were 
indicative of the fact that even the supposedly internationalist Left was 
itself immersed in the nationalities question that manifested in the ideologi-
cal divide between Austro-Marxists and Radical Balkan Federalists.  
Despite their shared namesakes, the South Slav social democratic parties 
were divided by a range of differing ideological and national influences, 
as well as the political systems in which they were obliged to function. 
Unlike Bulgaria and Serbia, where universal male suffrage had been 
introduced in 1879 and 1869 respectively, the Dual Monarchy’s restric-
tive system of political enfranchisement, particularly in its Hungarian 
portion, locked the majority of South Slavs out of the political process 
entirely.34 This was even more evident in Ottoman-ruled Macedonia, 
where organised political groups were virtually non-existent outside of 
the larger towns. Furthermore, under the Ottomans’ system of confes-
sional communities,  Macedonian Slavs were legally classified as either 
Turks or ethnic Bulgarians, submerging any attempt to present the case 
for an independent Macedonian identity while strengthening the territo-
rial claims of ‘Greater Bulgarian’ expansionists.35 By contrast, no coherent 
socialist movement existed in the nationally-homogenous principality of 
Montenegro where politics continued to revolve around the patrimonial 
figure of Crown Prince Nikola I Petrović-Njegoš and an assortment of 
shifting clan allegiances.36   
This spectrum of identity and tradition was further complicated 
by diverging philosophical influences and political cultures in those 
territories where an organised political left had managed to develop. Like 
their nationalist rivals, Croat and Slovene social democrats often defined 
themselves through a stated opposition to Austrian and Hungarian 
chauvinism, a position that brought most of their leaders into the ideological 
camp of Austro-Marxism.37 As a reform-oriented movement, leading 
Austro-Marxist theorists, notably Otto Bauer and Karl Renner, contested 
that the Monarchy’s own burgeoning nationalities question could be 
resolved by disassociating the concept of nations from specific geographical 
territories. In place of the homeland, Bauer and Renner echoed Marković 
in proposing a federalised association of differing cultural groups. In a 
more practical sense however, leading Austro-Marxists conceived of their 
theory as an alternative to imperialism, with Austria-Hungary still serving 
as a force for economic development in the Balkans.38 
Socialists in Bulgaria and Serbia, by contrast, drew inspiration from 
more radical movements: both the BWSDP and SSDP for instance, were 
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modelled on the Social Democratic Party of Germany.39 Nevertheless, 
the growing bellicosity of regional nationalism and rising fears regard-
ing Austria-Hungary’s territorial aspirations, following the annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908, prompted the adoption of Balkan Federalism 
as a solution to regional matters. In defining the concept of zadruga 
socialism, Marković had emphasised the combined potential to serve as a 
force for direct revolutionary change as one of the Balkan peoples’ most 
shared characteristics. For Tucović, and Marković’s other historical heirs, 
the Balkan revolutionary tradition was reinterpreted as a historical strug-
gle against various regressive forces which sought to stymie the formation 
of an industrial proletariat. This subsequently redefined the concept of a 
Balkan Federation as a form of protective carapace to incubate this process, 
while the nationalities question was perceived as a deliberate ploy by the 
ruling elites to obfuscate issues of social inequality.40 In addition, Blagoev, 
Tucović, Lapčević and other leading pro-Federalists grew increasingly 
vehement in lobbying for closer inter-regional economic cooperation 
as a solution to the perceived dominance of Austria-Hungarian capital. 
Following the cessation of the ‘Pig War’, in which the Monarchy unsuc-
cessfully attempted to impose a customs blockade on Serbia between 1906 
and 1908, Tucović proposed that Serbia turn economically ‘inwards’ in 
the pursuit of forming a Balkan Federation. Failure to do so, would, he 
warned, amount to an effective regression back to the foreign imperial 
rule that the Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians had revolted against during the 
nineteenth century.41 
As with its faltering embrace of the peasantry, the Left’s efforts to 
appropriate this revolutionary tradition were contested by the parallel 
rise of Balkan nationalism. Following Marković’s premature death, the 
Radical-Socialist Party, rebranded as the People’s Radical Party in the 1880s 
had moved away from its socialist roots to embrace a suitably ambiguous 
mixture of agrarianism, liberalism and Greater Serbian nationalism. Under 
the direction of Marković’s former disciple Nikola Pašić the party came 
to dominate both Serbian and early-Yugoslavian politics until the 1920s, 
with Pašić styling himself as the region’s Bismarck. Correspondingly, 
Bulgaria’s later shift to full independence in 1908, under its authoritarian 
Crown Prince Ferdinand I, saw a gradual escalation of nationalist agitation 
in Macedonia.42
In the period immediately preceding 1914, the revolutionary energy 
of the region increasingly fell under this nationalist sway with Marxist 
rhetoric employed as an affectation rather than an expression of politi-
cal intent. Founded in Thessaloniki in 1893, the so-called Internal 
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Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) initially espoused 
the ideological desire for an autonomous Macedonia founded on a belief 
in ethnic and religious equality and the preservation of the Ottomans’ 
legacy of multi-culturalism. Infiltration by Bulgarian nationalist agita-
tors subverted this idealism however, transforming the IMRO into a 
vehicle for Greater Bulgarian interests. It was soon joined by rival groups 
from Greece and Serbia. Assassination, kidnapping and torture, prop-
erty destruction, and armed robbery were increasingly directed towards 
civilians as well as the Ottoman authorities. In certain districts, IMRO 
cells were even reported to be levying taxes in exchange for granting local 
Christian Slav residents their ‘protection’, allegedly from Turkish and 
non-Slavonic Albanian bands.43 
These activities reached their apex with the Ilinden–Preobrazhenie 
Uprising in August 1903. A wave of armed insurgencies across Macedonia, 
supported by the peasantry, elicited a harsh response resulting in the 
deaths of thousands alongside accusations of mass rape and the punitive 
burning of homes by Ottoman soldiers, with waves of refugees fleeing 
to Bulgaria.44 Lamenting the uprising’s consequences, the left-leaning 
Macedonian Slav linguist Krste Misirkov warned that the cause of revolu-
tionary struggle was now hostage to nationalist ‘megalomania’:
… it is not Russia or Austria-Hungary that are the enemies of 
Macedonia, but Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia. Our country can be saved 
from ruin only by struggling fiercely against these states … 45
Regardless of these concerns, for most social democrats in the South 
Slavonic Balkans regional and international matters, as well as the impli-
cations of nationalist violence, were initially only of marginal interest. 
Despite the overthrow and murder of Serbia’s unpopular pro-Habsburg 
King Aleksander I by a group of nationalist military officers in June 1903 
and the outbreak of the Ilinden–Preobrazhenie Uprising less than two 
months later, neither event was sufficient to sustain the wider interests of 
the Left. Indeed, beyond overtures to the aspirations for international rev-
olution, even the suggestion of a Balkan Federation initially merited little 
enthusiasm from the Serb and Bulgarian movements. In 1894 for example, 
a proclamation by the SDPCS’s leader Ivan Ancel that Croats and Serbs 
were one people was rejected in Serbia. Fearing an attempted Habsburg 
encroachment, Belgrade’s socialist circles insisted that closer relations 
were unfeasible since their countries’ domestic contexts were ‘too differ-
ent’.46 This was further illustrated during Austria-Hungary’s annexation 
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of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the international crisis it precipitated, in 
September 1908. Having played an active role in fostering the territory’s 
trade union movement since 1905, with Bosnian Serbs dominating its 
leadership, the SSDP joined with the government in voicing its opposi-
tion to the annexation. Among his comrades, Tucović alone suggested that 
Bosnia might be representative of a wider Balkan identity rather than an 
exclusively Serbian one.47 
The international crisis precipitated by the Habsburg Monarchy’s 
annexation also exposed the ideological cleavage between the SSDP and its 
Austro-Marxist counterparts. At the 1907 Socialist International Congress 
in Stuttgart, SSDP delegates clashed with those from the Monarchy over 
the former’s support for an anti-colonial resolution. Opponents argued 
back that for those living in underdeveloped parts of the world, the 
‘civilising mission’ was necessary to encourage industrialisation and the 
formation of class consciousness.48 In a subsequent meeting with Tucović 
in June 1908, the SDPCS president Vitomar Korać dismissed claims that 
Bosnian workers were victims of colonial exploitation by the Habsburg 
administration that had governed the province on behalf of the Ottoman 
sultan since 1878. Rejecting a memorandum, proposed by Tucović, calling 
for condemnation of the Dual Monarchy by the International, Korać 
insisted that full annexation would, in fact, remedy the current suffering 
and marginalisation of the urban proletariat.49  
These disparities in opinion failed to deter Tucović’s hardening resolve 
that the intervention demonstrated by Austria-Hungary’s ‘barbarian act 
of annexation’ constituted the most salient threat to Balkan socialism, 
dealing a blow to the region’s development by jeopardising international 
peace.50 While the SSDP’s stance on intervention initially represented a 
minority viewpoint, developments in the 1910s gradually afforded it 
greater credence alongside the idea of a federal Balkan entity. Already 
in 1910, Tucović and Lapčević’s warnings over the dangers of Austria-
Hungary’s ‘expansionist capitalism’ in the Balkans as a threat to wider 
international peace gained them numerous anti-war allies in the Second 
International, including Leon Trotsky. Nevertheless, the disproportion-
ate level of influence wielded by larger organisations, particularly the 
avowedly Austro-Marxist Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Austria, 
generated further disenchantment with the association. ‘The delegates of 
the small nations are lost in the Socialist International, just as the small 
nations are in world politics’, Tucović glibly remarked in his corre-
spondence with the SSDP’s Central Committee during the 1910 Socialist 
International Congress in Copenhagen.51
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Increasing insistence from more radical elements of the left on the need 
for a social democratic stance moved towards its climax with the outbreak 
of the Balkan Wars. Leading socialists, including Tucović, were con-
scripted into the armies of the so-called ‘Balkan League’ – which included 
Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia – and mobilised to drive out the remaining 
Ottoman imperial presence. Writing on the massacre of Albanian civilians 
in Kosovo by Serbian and Montenegrin forces, the former SSDP leader 
accused Serbia’s ruling elite of waging ‘colonial war’ and ‘the attempted pre-
determined murder’ of the Albanian nation.52 Yet, in contrast to Misirkov’s 
earlier denunciations, the atrocities perpetuated by the Serbs were simply an 
expression of malicious ‘foreign influences’ and ‘degenerate higher culture’ 
of Serbia’s elite as they sought to imitate Great Power imperialism:
Our bourgeoisie bends under the pressure of its northern neighbours, 
clings tightly to the coat-tails of Russian diplomacy, and borrows 
the means by which it rules from foreign capitalist companies. It has 
acquired the ideology of an exploiter and a proprietor that sees itself 
at the head of a hungry army, and as the master of several million 
oppressed subjects … The very real and, regretfully, evil consequences 
of that campaign have exposed to the whole nation the incapacity of 
the ruling classes to conduct a policy which is in the national interest.53
Additionally, the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, coupled with a growing 
intransigence in the attitudes of Austria-Hungary’s rulers towards reform-
ing the Dual Monarchy, prompted more moderate socialist factions to 
reconsider their stance on the notion that Habsburg expansionism might 
be a ‘civilising force’.54 Seeking to possibly capitalise on any perceived ide-
ological floundering that Budapest and Vienna’s increasingly draconian 
measures may have engendered in the Austro-Marxist camp, Tucović’s 
correspondence insisted that, despite the war, external intrigue repre-
sented the greatest danger to regional peace. Only a social-democratic 
federation, divorced from the ‘malign influences’ of the Great Powers, 
could defeat Austria-Hungary and Italy’s plans to ‘permanently throttle’ 
the revolutionary spirit of the Balkan peoples.55 
War and Revolution in the South Slavonic Balkans
While the Balkan Wars failed to undermine a growing inter-ethnic dia-
logue on the prospects of a future federation, the First World War almost 
immediately halted all socialist activity in the South Slavonic Balkans. 
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Widespread opposition from the region’s social democratic parties resulted 
in their being banned as part of a wartime cessation of civilian politics. 
Indeed, by the end of 1915, all socialist parties were dissolved or outlawed 
as Serbia fell under the occupation of the Central Powers. Alongside an 
estimated 20 per cent of the entire Serbian national population, many of 
the Left’s most charismatic figures such as Tucović were killed, impris-
oned or driven into exile, their voices largely obscured beneath a tide of 
patriotic propaganda.56 This fractious context was further exacerbated in 
September 1915 when Bulgaria formalised an alliance with the Central 
Powers, disqualifying it from the prospect of joining a post-war South 
Slavonic State, much to the anger of committed Balkan Federalists.57 
Developments in Russia invariably cast a lengthy shadow over Balkan 
politics. With the steady deterioration of morale and wartime conditions 
within the Habsburg army after 1915, thousands of Bosnian, Croat and 
Serb peasant recruits stationed on the Eastern Front began to desert, 
while retaining their weapons and even their military formations. Upon 
desertion, many of these former soldiers dispersed across the Monarchy’s 
eastern and southern territories, often hiding in woods as outlaws. They 
were later joined by former POWs returning from captivity in Russia 
where they had been radicalised by the October Revolution. Although 
lacking a coherent ideological focus, many of these armed units had organ-
ised themselves, often with the support of local peasants, into self-styled 
‘Green Cadres’. Espousing an anarchic mixture of revolution and peasant 
autonomy, the Green Cadres launched numerous raids to plunder towns 
and destroy symbols associated with state authority.58  
The Russian Revolution’s political reverberations had, unsurprisingly, 
a profound impact on the politically proactive remnants of the South 
Slavonic Left. However, it would be incorrect to overstate its impor-
tance in relation to the war itself. Like the Green Cadres, whose primary 
motivations were mostly rooted in localised social unrest, even the more 
radical leftists concerned themselves with the progression of the conflict 
in South-East Europe and the region’s post-war future.59 Indeed, the sense 
of trepidation towards the South Slavs’ larger neighbours, precipitated by 
Tucović’s earlier warnings, were heightened by the revelation that Italy 
had been promised extensive territory in the Slav-populated Eastern 
Adriatic in exchange for its entry into the war against Germany.60 
By 1917, what remained of the SSDP’s exiled leadership had increas-
ingly adopted Tucović’s rhetoric of revolutionary unification as the only 
solution to the threat of Great Power colonialism and the perpetuation of 
victimhood. In a report to the Third Zimmerwald Conference of anti-war 
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socialists in Stockholm that year, Dušan Popović, the SSDP secretary, 
asserted that occupying Habsburg and Bulgarian forces were undertak-
ing an ‘extermination campaign’ comparable to Armenia.61 Despite having 
come to lead the party’s pro-Leninist faction, Popović specifically empha-
sised that continued support for the Entente’s war effort, rather than a 
shift to world revolution, was necessary in order to rescue those who 
had fallen under the occupation of the Central Powers from ‘threatened 
extinction’.62  
The ideological mantle of unity through language and tradition con-
veyed by the mostly Liberal-Nationalist wartime Yugoslavist movement 
was also demonstrated in appeals for the liberation of Yugoslavia’s 
future working class by Bosnian and Croat delegates.63 From a Marxist 
perspective, it was argued that the economic potential of the Habsburg 
Empire’s South Slavonic provinces had been squandered by Austrian and 
Hungarian officials and landlords treating them as ‘African colonies’; 
forty years of ‘civilisatory activity’ had yielded few positives to counter 
widespread illiteracy while those attempting to rectify this state of affairs 
faced persecution. To the Habsburg authorities, it was argued, civilisation 
merely equated to the safe-guarding of feudal privileges, ensuring that in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina ‘650,000 persons … live in a state of veritable medi-
eval slavery and work like beasts of burden for 10,000 Mussleman Aga 
families’.64 In Dalmatia ‘the Jugoslav peasant languishes under the latin 
form of serfdom, the state of the colonati’.65 To the north, feudalism also 
persisted in ‘the serfdom of the mortgage’ locking the ‘rural masses’ into 
generational cycles of debt exacerbated by banks controlled by a surplus 
of ‘feudal squires and priests’.66
On 20 July 1917, Pašić, Serbia’s then Prime Minister-in-exile, and Ante 
Trumbić, the Croat leader of the anti-Habsburg secessionist Yugoslav 
Committee, signed the Corfu Declaration. This loosely-worded state-
ment of joint intention not only pledged both parties to the Habsburg 
Monarchy’s post-war dissolution, but formalised the creation of an inde-
pendent South Slavonic state as an official war aim. For the scattered 
and isolated remnants of the South Slavonic Left, such an action was 
duly, albeit not always enthusiastically, accepted as a matter of absolute 
necessity.67
The First World War thus represented a contradiction. Despite scat-
tering and dividing the South Slavonic Left, the chaos and humanitarian 
tragedy inflicted upon the region’s civilian populace, notably in Serbia, 
appeared to validate the radical belief that the pre-war status quo no longer 
guaranteed the promise of socioeconomic transition. Moreover, while 
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the deeper repercussions of the Russian Revolution would soon be made 
apparent, the era of the Great War served more as a point of convergence 
and consolidation for what would become the main preoccupations of the 
South Slavonic Left after 1918. Following the sudden death of Popović, 
its most avowedly pro-Bolshevik leader, in November 1918, a statement 
issued by the revived SSDP did not even mention Russia, focusing instead 
on the war, nationalities and denouncing the new Yugoslav government.68
Conclusion: The Völkerabfälle revival, and the origins of Titoism?
The conclusion of the First World War and subsequent declaration of 
the Yugoslav Kingdom less than a month later, not only brought pre-
viously disparate groupings together into a unified body, but served to 
determine the final form of South Slavonic socialist politics prior to 1945. 
Notwithstanding Bulgaria’s exclusion from the union, at a practical level 
the creation of Yugoslavia appeared to initially resolve the more pressing 
concern of foreign interference. Austria-Hungary was politically mori-
bund by October 1918, and essentially disappeared the following month, 
while Pašić and Trumbić’s skilful negotiating tactics at the Paris Peace 
Conference had mostly preserved the new country’s territorial integrity, 
despite Italy’s aggressive posturing.69 Internally as well, the principal threat 
to the Left’s aspirations of presenting a radical alternative to the socio-
political status quo had already been dealt with by the Serbian army’s 
deployment to the former Habsburg territories in late 1918, leading to the 
disbanding, or assimilation, of the Green Cadres.70 
By 1921, the majority of the Yugoslavian Left had unified into the (cen-
trist) Socialist and the (revolutionary) Communist parties. Widespread 
disaffection from returning soldiers, the unemployed and other margin-
alised sections of the urban and rural proletariats allowed the latter to 
achieve its biggest electoral successes, briefly becoming the single largest 
opposition party in the 1920 elections. Despite a ban on its activities in 
1921, and a subsequent failure to articulate a coherent revolutionary alter-
native to its rival ideologies, the new Communist Party’s ability to tap into 
the rising social unrest bolstered its ranks with newly politicised activists, 
including a certain Josip Broz ‘Tito’.71
This article has explored the complex and multi-faceted local and 
international contexts which shaped the agendas and ideologies of the 
South Slavonic Left.72 For the majority of the SSDP and its counterparts 
in Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, the turn of the twentieth century was 
defined by a gradual acceptance that a commitment to revolutionary 
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Marxist doctrine amounted to political oblivion. This shift in priorities was 
exemplification in reactions to the Bosnian Annexation Crisis of 1908. On 
the one hand, the ability to shield and nurture a nascent urban working 
class against the influences of local nationalism or its stifling by parochial, 
anti-urban agrarian movements, became a central tenet of the socialist 
mission. By the outbreak of the Balkan Wars however, appropriating the 
anti-imperialist tenets espoused by their political opponents became an 
essential strategy in order to protect this fragile process of social transition 
from the predations of external forces. The excesses of the First World 
War granted this belief further veracity: Yugoslavia became a necessity for 
banishing lingering perceptions of the South Slavs as mere Völkerabfälle 
whose destiny would continue to be determined by outsiders. 
The decade that preceded the outbreak of the First World War, might 
therefore be viewed as a period in which the South Slavonic Left sought to 
develop a ‘Balkan’ identity. Conversely, the Left’s continuing propensity 
to absorb ideas from outside the region, such as the SDCPS’s and YSDP’s 
gravitating towards Austro-Marxism, mirrored divisions already present 
in international socialism. Fractional tensions and political inconsistency 
continued after the First World War. In keeping with the Comintern’s 
opposition to the Paris peace settlements, Communist leaders who received 
instruction in the Soviet Union, argued at first for the immediate dissolu-
tion of ‘Versailles Yugoslavia’. Such a stance placed them at odds with the 
party rank and file and the broader Left that now conceived Yugoslavia as 
critical to a future Balkan Federation; by the 1930s, preserving Yugoslavia 
as a vehicle for revolution was also a Communist priority.73 While these 
ideological currents were repurposed towards the goal of turning the 
peasantry into an industrial proletariat, their cultural and philosophical 
form remained. The Left’s efforts to confront the nationalities question 
and economic development before and after the Second World War, 
recurrently involved a federal solution, built upon localised self-manage-
ment.74 Furthermore, the mythologizing of the Communist resistance to 
the Yugoslav Balkans’ occupation by the Axis powers from 1941 to 1945, 
evoked Tucović’s belief in the necessity of cumulative struggle for South 
Slavonic identity’s very existence.75 
The process through which the pre-Communist Left rationalised 
and looked to harness regional political traditions, including Balkan 
Federalism, represented the genesis of a distinctive type of South Slavonic 
socialist thought that would come to exert considerable influence over the 
later development of the European and wider international Left. 
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